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BOOK REVIEWS
The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy. By ROBERT H. JACKSON. New
York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1941. Pp. xx, 361.
The Attorney-General of the United States and a protagonist in the latest
phase of "the struggle for judicial supremacy", Mr. Jackson concerns him-
self, in the main, with the initial failure and ultimate success of the New
Deal in its attempt to impose its views concerning the Constitution upon
the Supreme Court. By way of background, he sketches in those previous
constitutional crises which are called to mind by the catchwords "Marbury
v. Madison", "Dred Scott", "Legal Tender", "Income Tax". He writes, how-
ever, not as an historian; events are selected and marshalled to support his
theses as to the attitudes the Supreme Court has taken and should take
toward the other departments of government.
The general lines of his thinking are clearly indicated by ,the title of his
book: it is in terms of power and of a struggle for power, in accordance
with the fashion set by Messrs. Corwin and Haines. The fact that a large
number of thoughtful persons in positions of influence, have come to regard
the Supreme Court in this aspect may have played a decisive part in shaping
our recent constitutional history. We should be thankful, therefore, that
Mr. Jackson's views-views shared, as we know, by many of his colleagues
-should have been so carefully and thoughtfully expounded.
Whether one happens to share it or not, it is impossible to doubt the reality
of the author's conviction that the retreat of the Supreme Court in and
since 1937 has been to and not from or beyond the Constitution. With his
final conclusion that the Court ought, because it must, give way before the
political departments whenever it becomes clear that they refuse to acquiesce
in its decisions, one is likewise forced to agree. But although one who is
not a member of the administration might be content to say, that if the
administration prove obdurate the Court has no choice but to yield; a mem-
ber of the administration itself must answer the further question: what
circumstance will justify such obduracy? One may venture to suggest that
an assurance of one's own rightness (plus knowledge that one holds ulti-.
mate command) can hardly be enough, once the basic premise of constitu-
tionalism is accepted: the doctrine of self-restraint ought to apply, mutatis
mnutandis, to the legislative and the executive as well as to the judiciary.
Yet it would be too much to expect the political departments of govern-
ment always to succeed in tolerance, where the judiciary have often failed.
Nor is tolerance always to be accounted a virtue. It is a virtue only if the
views we tolerate are morally indifferent. We lawyers generally fight shy
bf moral issues, and Mr. Jackson is no exception; in consequence he lumps
together slavery; legal tender, and the income tax, due process and the com-
merce clause as involving the same kind of question. In this reviewer's
opinion, he has thereby obscured some important distinctions.
It seems clear that Mr. Jackson's chief concern is peace, secured through
compromise, in the legislature, the arena of compromise. He sees the Court
closing the door to one compromise after another, which the legislature
has worked out, from the Dred Scott decision down to the Jones and Laugh-
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lin case. But it seems hard to see how many of the issues of which he writes
could have been compromised: slavery was either right or wrong, protection
of property rights under the due process clause was either a safeguard against
or an instrument of oppression and, on an entirely different level, an in-
come tax was necessarily either direct and subject to the rule of apportion-
ment or an excise and subject to the rule of uniformity. It seems to this
reviewer that the part played by the New Deal in forcing its views as to
"due process" on the Court cannot be justified at all on the ground urged
by Mr. Jackson, that they represented a compromise, but are to be justified,
if at all, on the precisely contrary ground that the issue involved was one
which could not be compromised and that acquiescence in the Court's views
would perpetuate a grievous wrong. For each of us, of course, the answer
to the question whether this is a justification depends upon whose views we
share-the old Supreme Courts' or the New Deal's.
Theodore S. Hope, Ir.*
Ithaca, New York
Corporate Dividends. By DONALD KEHL. New York: The Ronald Press
Co. 1941. Pp. xi, 367.
The subject of corporate dividends may be approached from many points
of view. Mr. Kehl writes primarily from the lawyer's standpoint. He has
traced the law of dividends to its earliest sources, illuminating many doubtful
questions by his researches into the past. Old corporate charters and old stat-
utes are alike used to clarify present-day problems. Statutes now in force in
every state are carefully analyzed and their development, explained. The
case law is discussed with precision and intelligence, the chapters on "Rela-
tive Rights of Preferred and Common Stockholders" and on "Choice of
Law in Determining Validity of Dividends" being particularly worthy of
mention. Other chapters of perhaps equal interest and value are those relat-
ing to remedies against directors and stockholders. The entire work, in fact,
seems characterized by thoroughness, discrimination and care.
Accountants as well as lawyers should find the book useful. The author's
discussion of accounting problems is clear and well-informed, though con-
taining little which can be described as novel. A valuable summary is pre-
sented of the views now generally accepted in the accounting profession, with.
ample documentation to aid the reader who wishes to make further researches.
There is no attempt to explore the economic aspects of the valuation prob-
lem, or to consider dividend policies in their larger implications. Emphasis
is placed on the practical decisions to be made by courts, lawyers, and
accountants.
In the list of subjects treated certain omissions are noticeable. There is
no discussion of the problems arising when shares are sold between the
dividend declaration date and the payment date. No mention is made of
the rules of the stock exchanges on dividend matters. The subject of the
*Assistant Professor of Law, Cornell University.
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consolidated balance sheet is dismissed in two paragraphs-though it would
seem to deserve extended discussion. Only passing mention is made of prob-
lems relating to the declaration and payment of dividends by subsidiary
companies.
On the mechanical side, the printing and proof reading are excellent. A
table of cases is lacking, though there is an index and a table of contents.
Cross-references are not as numerous as they might be. For example, the
discussion of "Original Consideration Received' is to be found at § 22.1; that
of "Paid-in Surplus" at § 29; and that of "Premium on Stock" at § 45.2.
The value of these discussions would be greatly increased by adequate cross-
reference and comparison. Similarly, on page 241, the 1939 amendment to
§ 58 of the New York Stock Corporation Law is discussed; on page 255,
Mr. Kehl argues that directors cannot safely rely on this amendment, since
there has been no corresponding amendment to § 664 of the New York
Penal Law. Surely there should be a note on page 241 directing the reader's
attention to the subsequent discussion. Other instances of the same sort
might be mentioned. The reader who does his own cross-referencing will,
however, be well repaid.
Concise and accurate, this book brings together in one volume a mass of
material which might have been presented in twice the space. It should prove
of high utility to the corporate aidviser.
George T. Washington*
Ithaca, N. Y.
Our Constitution: Tool or Testament? By BERYL HAROLD LEVY. With
an introduction by ROBERT H. JACKSON. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Pp. 315.
To the large collection of critical literature on the "legislative" activities
of the Supreme Court, Dr. Beryl Levy adds his book, Our Constitzution:
Tool or Testament. It is a typical liberal treatment. The author argues that
the Court, using as its basic guide the "presumption of constitutionality,"
should "recognize that the lawmaking power resides in the legislature." As
so many have done before him, he maintains that a sacrosanct, over-reveren-
tial attitude toward the Supreme Court is outmoded and acts as a hindrance
to national development. The Constitution should be viewed as a flexible
'instrument, able to meet the needs of our constantly changing society. Above
all the Supreme Court should practice self-restraint in exercising its power
of judicial review to insure "a meaningful government of laws-the laws
of our duly designated lawmakers and not of unelected, lifetime judicial
legislators who are not directly answerable to the legislature or to the people."'
These arguments have been voiced before. The descriptions of the judicial
careers of four leading Supreme Court justices, Marshall, Taney, Holmes,
and Brandeis, contribute no new material to the student of constitutional




history, but attempt "to show the connection between their philosophy, on
the one hand, and significantly selected judicial opinions, on the other. ' 2
The main value of the book lies in the expression of concern over the
apathy of the Supreme Court's recent critics who feel that the crisis has
passed and that the Court has been taught never again to stray from its
"normal" functions. Despite changes in the personnel and the attitude of the
Court which came in the wake of President Roosevelt's defeated Court
Reorganization Plan, the author is not satisfied in retaining the status quo
merely because the Court now seems to be exercising "due continence." Inter-
ested in taking preventive action to forestall similar activities by the Court
ih the future, Dr. Levy contends that "while the memory of our recent
frustrations by the previously constituted Court is still seen," we should limit
the Court's power to declare laws of Congress unconstitutional. The statute
he suggests "would provide that for an ordinary law, dealing with an economic
problem, some number more than five votes . . . . would be required to
declare the law unconstitutional. For a law restricting a civil liberty, how-
ever, five votes as at present, or fewer, should suffice to declare the law un-
constitutional. ' 3 As the author admits, the suggested law is open to criticism
as to practical and administrative difficulties. Would such a Congressional
statute be an effective restraint on the Court? Is the differentiation between
economic laws and civil liberty laws justifiable? How may laws involving
both elements be classified? Who is to decide in what category a particular
law belongs? The importance of the suggested statute, however, is not in
its content, but rather in the suggestion to provide limitations on the possi-
ble return of the Supreme Court to the "legislative" sphere, with consequent
usurpation of the rightful powers of Congress.
For the layman, such a book always stimulates thought and discussion on
a subject which is usually considered far removed from his day to day
existence. The terminology and judicial and philosophical reasoning, although
simplified in spots, will cause the average reader difficulty. For the student
of constitutional law, the author's main contribution revolves about the
warning against a false sense of security from future usurpation of legisla-
tive power by the judiciary and the advice to make adequate provision
against a possible recurrence of destructive decisions characteristic of the
reign of the "Congress of the Nine Old Men."
Ned Weissberg*
Ithaca, New York
International Law: A Treatise. By L. OPPENHEIM. 6th Edition edited
by H. LAUTERPACHT. Vol. II, Disputes, War, and Neutrality. New York:
Longmans, Green and Co. 1940. Pp. xliv, 766.
Publication of a new edition of Oppenheim's Interntiovla Law has always
been something of an event for international lawyers. The extended biblio-
2p. xv.
3250.
*Assistant in Government, Cornell University.
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graphical references are of great value and the comments of the editor on
current issues are received with interest and respect, if not always with com-
plete agreement. However, the liberties taken with the text of Professor
Oppenheim's great treatise by his various editors raise a serious question.
Professor Oppenheim died in 1919, after publishing two editions of his
work. In 1920 Mr. Ronald F. Roxburgh published a third edition, stating
in his preface that it had proved impracticable "to mark each minor change
in Oppenheim's words." In 1926 a fourth edition was published under the
editorship of Professor Arnold D. McNair. Professor McNair felt that
he had no choice but to follow the editorial methods of Mr. Roxburgh. He
therefore declined "to indicate the new material by means of brackets,"
preferring rather "to work in the new matter, freely and where it seems to
fit best . . .without giving warning of its presence." In his fifth edition in
1935, Professor Lauterpacht also felt that it was "altogether impracticable
to attempt to distinguish between the text of the original version and the
changes effected .... So much has to be added . . .so much has to be modi-
fied, omitted or shortened ... ." In the present edition Professor Lauterpacht
writes that he has "made further progress in the work of re-writing and
expanding this treatise. Substantial portions of the preceding edition have
been omitted. .. ."
The reviewer will limit himself to but one example of the results of this
editorial method. If Professor Oppenheim were living today, he would
undoubtedly be surprised to read in sec. 296 of volume II of the sixth edi-
tion of his treatise that international law is "primarily" a law between states.
He had written that international law is a law "only and exclusively"
between states. Certainly nothing happened between 1935-the last edition
which carried Oppenheim's words-and 1940, to warrant such a change.
If some writers have asserted that there has been a trend towards regarding
individuals as subjects of international law, the rise of totalitarian regimes
has undoubtedly rendered such a modification of international law less likely
in 1940 than even a few years ago. In any case, whether Dr. Lauterpacht is
right or wrong in rewriting sec. 296, the views he expresses are not those
of Oppenheim, whose book he is editing. The amazing proof of this is
contained in a footnote which Lauterpacht has appended to sec. 296, that
"for an emphatic expression" of the contrary view, consult sec. 296 of the
five previous editions of this work! It is not entirely the march of events
since 1919 which causes the reviewer to wonder how long it will be before
Oppenheim's International Law contains nothing of Oppenheim.
Dr. Lauterpacht is a brilliant and learned scholar in his own right. It
seems high time to leave Oppenheim to his deserved rest. We would welcome
a treatise by Lauterpacht.
Herbert W. Briggs*
Ithaca, New York
*Professor of Government, Cornell University.
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Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States: Canadian Relations,
1784-1860. Vol. I (1784-1820). Selected and arranged by WILLIAm R.
MANNING. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
1940. Pp. xlvii, 947.
Students of history and international law will welcome this new series
of documents edited by Dr. William R. Manning which will provide them
with the salient portions of the diplomatic correspondence of the United
States with Great Britain concerning her North American possessions. The
present volume, the first of four, deals with Great Britain's refusal to surren-
der the posts, Jay's treaty, the various boundary disputes arising out of the
treaty of 1783 and the Louisiana Purchase, the fishing liberties, Great
Britain's supposed policy of inciting the Indians living in American terri-
tory to hostilities, various aggravating border incidents preceding the War of
1812, the negotiations culminating in the Treaty of Ghent, and the Rush-
Bagot Convention.
The collection is divided into two parts: communications to Great Britain
and from Great Britain. This classification is somewhat misleading and would
not be accurate if Great Britain were understood both in a political and a
geographical sense. Letters which might have been included are Jay to Ran-
dolph, November 22, 1794, Jay to Grenville, October 13, 1794, and Wash-
ington to Jay, August 30, 1794. These have been printed in Cruikshank, Cor-
respondence of John Graves Simcoe.
It is not possible to discuss Great Britain's handling of Canadian affairs
in relation to the United States during these years as a separate subject
unconnected with West Indian matters, the European situation, or the wider
field of Anglo-American relations, and therefore the documents, often
merely parts of documents, selected for this volume are like a jig-saw
puzzle with the more important pieces missing. This of course was unavoid-
able. As a rule the editor has been generous in printing enclosures but it is
tantalizing to find omitted some that related to the vexed question of Great
Britain's Indian policy. It seems highly unlikely that "the British Minister
probably left with the Secretary of State" Charles Stevenson's letter,' which
refers to the American people as "vain, & ungratefull, & that vipe&- progeny
of Felons." It is more likely that, as Stevenson feared, the "common course
of post" had not proved altogether reliable.
Among the more interesting documents in the collection are the letters
interchanged by John Quincy Adams and the British Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs on the question whether there is "no exception to the
rule that all Treaties are put an end to by a subsequent War between the same
parties"2 It is amusing to find a lease-lend proposal of 1798, occasioned this
time by American unpreparedness for war with France. It was linked with
a plan for joint defence by the United States and Great Britain of their




Great Britain's opinion on these proposals. 3 If any report was made by
him it is not included in this collection.
Paul W. Gates*
Ithaca, New York
Cases and Other Materials on the Law of Debtors' Estates. By WESLEY
A. STURGES. Third Edition by J. Douglass Poteat and Eugene V. Rostow.
St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1940, Pp. XXI, 886.
Law teachers in the debtor-creditor field are fortunate in the recent publi-
cation of two fine casebooks-a Third Edition of Professor Sturges' Cases
and Other Materials on Debtors' Estates, edited by Professors Poteat and
Rostow, and a new book by Professor Glenn, entitled Cases and Materials on
Creditors' Rights. These books, while compiled by teachers whose approach
to the study of law is quite different, nevertheless have one great funda-
mental element in common: both regard the study of the debtor-creditor
relationship as a functional process; neither uses the Hanna-McLaughin plan
of pouring the remedies of the creditor into separate procedural molds,
studied seriatim.
While the writer has reviewed Professor Glenn's book in detail else-
where," a word concerning its author-is of interest in studying the Sturges
volume. Professor Glenn is fundamentally a scholarly lawyer, with a lawyer's
approach to legal problems. lie had behind him years of successful practice
in New York City, before joining the law faculty of the University of Vir-
ginia. He alleges that he is not a statistician and that he does not read
"'surveys' of the sort that some of our young researchi men turn out." He
does read advance sheets and law reviews.2 Therefore, it is not surprising
that Professor Glenn has packed his book with judicial opinions to the
exclusion of everything else.
Professor Sturges, in contrast, does not have the traditional lawyer's ap-
proach to legal problems. His teaching methods are difficult to describe. He
delights in cutting out the vitals of a judicial opinion and then subjecting the
dismembered parts to various statistical,3 dialectical, political, and sociological
treatments.4 The result is at first something of a hodge-podge, but order
eventually comes out of chaos.
The several editions of Debtors' Estates have in part followed this metho-
dology. Accordingly, in addition to cases and much law review material,
the Sturges books have featured both testimony before and reports of legis-
*Associate Professor of History, Cornell University.
3p. 136.
189 U. OF PA. L. REv. - (June, 1941).2Gler-n, CASES ON CREDITORS' RIGHTS, 2 (1940).
3The reviewer knows that Professor Sturges does read "surveys" and that he some-
times encourages the writing of them.4Sometimes the new editors are almost as picturesque in their choice of language
as is Professor Sturges himself, to wit: "A diet of doctrine, even in refined and subtle
formulations, will give students intellectual rickets unless the doctrines are considered
in terms of their political and economic import." P. 2.
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lative committees, many hypothetical questions, and even an occasional news-
paper clipping.
The new edition carries on the best traditions of Sturges, but also shows
considerable improvement in the organization and arrangement of material.
As presently constituted, the Table of Contents fails into three principal seg-
ments: Part 1, "Methods of Terminating or Reorganizing the Insolvent En-
terprise"; Part 2, "Administration"; Part 3, "Discharge."
In contrast to the earlier editions, which open Part 1 with an immediate
plunge into the cases, the new editors write a brief preliminary chapter on
"The Study of Insolvency Proceedings" and introduce Chapter 2, "Non-
judicial Settlements", with a textual statement. In the first of these the
editors, after emphasizing the "Gargantuan" character of the materials to be
investigated, and after noting briefly the several "legal techniques used to
settle situations in insolvency", point out that "the student faces the pre-
liminary problem of examining the concept of insolvency, from the point
of view of the balance sheet and of the income statement." However, "pend-
ing further experiment in the development of appropriate materials for train-
ing law students in these fields, the editors adopt the compromise of suggest-
ing the following bibliography, thus deferring for yet another edition the
work of radical change in this part of the subject matter of the book."5 This
portent of things to come in future years is followed by a list of pertinent
writings in the accounting field particularly and in the insolvency field
generally.
The brief text introducing Chapter 2, "Non-Judicial Settlements", con-
cerns the methods employed by credit agencies, particularly the National
Association of Credit Men, in reorganizing or liquidating insolvent debtors.
The text is new, "but the idea of giving at least a passing nod to the insolvency
machinery of the credit men came from the earlier editions.
At the place where "Composition and Extension" is reached,6 Professors
Poteat and Rostow pick up and incorporate the series of decisions which
open the Second Edition. Directly thereafter follow the principal Sturges
cases on "Assignments for the Benefit of Creditors." Two changes now
gradually become apparent. First, the arrangement of material is .an im-
provement over that in former editions. The neiv editors have analyzed
thoroughly and rearranged logically the excellent material which constituted
the earlier books. But they have done more than this; they have added
much valuable material produced by their own independent research. This
conclusion applies also to Chapter 3, "Liquidation and Reorganization in
Equity," and even more forcefully to Chapter 4, wherein are collected the
materials, previously scattered, on "Binding the Dissenter in Non-Bankruptcy
Proceedings." In the second place, the volume has quieted down and has
become an excellent casebook. The high-powered, streamlined model which
streaked through Chapter 1 is now purring contentedly along the road. As
the book develops we see less and less of "courtroom dialectic" ,7 "diet of
doctrine",8 "intellectual rickets";9 we see more and more of such ancient
rP. 5.6p. 10.
7p. 1.
sSupra note 4.9 bid.
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legalisms as "stockholders' statutory liability" and "ancillary receivership."
It is in Chapter 5 of Part 1, "Proceedings Under the Bankruptcy Act",
that Professors Poteat and Rostow do their finest original work. As they
explain in their preface, the vast number of bankruptcy reorganizations
under Section 77B and Chapter X justify considerably more attention
to corporate reorganization than Professor Sturges gave in his earlier edi-
tions. Furthermore, it is no longer possible to stop where Sturges did, at "the
point when considerations involving the formation and execution of a plan
of reorganization become of dominant importance."' 0 The new editors are
quite right when they point out that "the idea of a fair and equitable plan
has proved to be a conception of creditors' rights involved in many contexts
and for many purposes."" Therefore, they tackle courageously and perform
well a most difficult task.
The second major division is Part 2, "Administration.' 2 This division is
broken down into four chapters: (1) "Appointment and Qualification of the
Assignee, Receiver, Trustee"; (2) "Continuation of the Business"; (3) "Col-
lection of Assets"; (4) "Proof and Allowance of Claims.' u3
Chapter 1 is slightly changed by the shifting of In re Federal Mail and
Express Co.1 4 Here, as at certain points throughout the book, no attempt
has been made to spoon-feed the student by indicating any changes in the
law occasioned by the enactment of the Chandler Act. Chapter 2 has been
brought down to date and, thus modernized, continues as the only collection
of materials on "continuing the business" available in any of the standard
insolvency casebooks.
Chapter 3 of Part 2 ("Administration") treats of "Collection of Assets."
Section 1 deals with "Procedure." Here the principal changes consist in
bringing the material in line with the Chandler Act and in certain rearrange-
ments. In the Second Edition "Set-Off and Counterclaim" followed "Sum-
mary Process and Plenary Action". In the Third Edition, "Set-Off and
Counterclaim" has been moved to the end of the section and Professor
Sturges' short Chapter 2, "Displacement of Compositions, Assignments and
Receiverships by Proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act", has been inserted
as Subsection (c) of "Procedure." This rearrangement may or may not
appeal to teachers of insolvency law. Logically, the material probably belongs
where Professor Poteat and Rostow place it. At the same time Professor
Sturges made very effective use of his tiny Chapter 2 as a bridge from his
introductory descriptive material on "Methods" to his later chapters on
"Administration."
Once the revisors have completed "Procedure", they follow the Sturges
outline for the remainder of Chapter 3. Little change has been made in
'OPreface to Second Edition, III.
"Preface to Third Edition, III.
12Part 2 of the earlier editions has been dropped and its contents incorporated in
Chapter 3 of the Third Edition. It was entitled: "Displacement of Compositions, Assign-
ments, and Receiverships by Proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act."
'
3 These chapter titles are taken from Part 3 of the earlier editions.
14233 Fed. 691 (S. D. N. Y., 1916).
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Section 2, "Assets Reserved to the Debtor and/or Dependents."' 5 Section 3,
as heretofore, concerns "Assets Which May Be Recovered and Retained for
the Estate." And, while the revisors have in general followed the Sturges
pattern, they frequently have improved the book, as by the addition of
American Surety Co. v. Canner'6 at page 555, an important decision not in-
cluded in the Second Edition but which appears in full in several of the
other standard insolvency casebooks. It should be noted also that the Sturges
collection of materials on "Fraudulent Conveyances" and "Preferential
Transfers" is quite ample for teaching purposes. Placed as it is near the end
of the book, and with only a brief scope-note to identify it, this very im-
portant segment of insolvency law seems, however, to be a little too deeply
buried.
Chapter 4 of Part 2, "Proof and Allowance of Claims" continues the same
pattern utilized in the Second Edition, with important recent decisions by
the Supreme Court added.1
7
Likewise little change from the Second Edition has been made in Part 3,
"Discharge." The brief final chapter in the Second Edition, entitled "Sus-
pended Discharge", has been dropped, along with several cases, and some
substitutions have been made in the material included from Congressional
Committee hearings. Otherwise, the chapter remains intact.
Regardless of the individual law teacher's idea of how materials in the
debtor-creditor field should be arranged for classroom use, the new edition of
Sturges is, as were its predecessors, required reading for all of us. Fifteen
years ago, while prosperity still dwelt in the land, Professor Sturges was
busy analyzing the process we now call the administration of a debtor's
estate. By the time the depression struck he had reached certaih definite
conclusions as to how the realities of that process should be studied. These
conclusions became "Cases and Other Materials on Debtors' Estates", a book
whose worthy tradition has been preserved by the highly competent editors
of the Third Edition.
Thomas Clifford Billig*
Washington, D. C.
*Assistant Professor of Law, Catholic University of America.
15This archaic "and/or" is in weird contrast to the breezy, behavioristic language
already referred to in Chapter 1 of Par. 1.
36251 N. Y. 1, 166 N. E. 783 (1929).
17 See, for example, Pepper v. Litton, 308 U. S. 295, 60 Sup. Ct. 238, at 699 (1939);
Ticonic Nat. Bank v. Sprague, 303 U. S. 406, 58 Sup. Ct. 612, at 755, (1938), and
United States v. Marxen, 307 U. S. 200, 59 Sup. Ct. 811, at 776 (1939).
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